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—  Book  Rev i ew  — 
A CIVIL  RIGHTS LIFE 
Nathaniel R.  Jones .  Answering 
the Call :  An Autobiography 
of the Modern Struggle to 
End Racial Discr im ination in  
America.  New York :  The  New 
Pre s s ,  2016 .  
Jonathan L. Entin† 
Nathaniel Jones has had an extraordinary career. Highlights include 
serving as the first African-American Assistant United States Attorney 
in the Northern District of Ohio; assistant general counsel of the Na-
tional Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (informally known as 
the Kerner Commission); general counsel of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People; and, for nearly a quarter-cen-
tury, judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
Now, at the age of ninety, Judge Jones has written an engaging, often 
impassioned memoir.1 This book should be of great interest to anyone 
interested in civil rights, especially in the North and West, after the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 and the Voting Rights Act of 
1965.3 And it should be of special interest to readers of this journal 
 
†  David L. Brennan Professor Emeritus of Law and Political Science, Case 
Western Reserve University. 
1. Judge Jones is not the only distinguished civil rights lawyer to produce a 
memoir as a nonagenarian. William T. Coleman, Jr., who was Secretary of 
Transportation under President Ford and chaired the board of the NAACP 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund for many years, published his 
autobiography at the same age. See William T. Coleman, Jr. with 
Donald T. Bliss, Counsel for the Situation: Shaping the Law to 
Realize America’s Promise (2010). 
2. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a 
to 2000h-6 (2012)). 
3. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. 
§§ 10301–10702 (2012)). 
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because Judge Jones has had a long connection with Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law. He hired several of our graduates as 
law clerks; one of them, Judge Kathleen McDonald O’Malley of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and formerly of 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, gets 
a specific shout-out (p. 236). So do two former faculty members.4 Judge 
Jones also served for several years as a member of the law school’s 
visiting committee, and he was one of the early speakers in the law 
school’s Frank J. Battisti Memorial Lecture series that was endowed by 
friends and former law clerks of the late chief judge of the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio (p. 242).5 
I 
The title, Answering the Call, has religious overtones,6 but Judge 
Jones seems never to have been inclined to the ministry.7 Rather, “The 
Call” was the title of a document that played a key role in the formation 
of the NAACP. Issued on the centennial of the birth of Abraham 
Lincoln, this document urged the nation to renew the struggle for racial 
 
4. My former colleague Roger Abrams (p. 193), who went on to serve as dean 
of three other law schools, filed the complaint and played an important role 
on the legal team in the Boston school case. See infra Part II.C.1. My late 
colleague Ted Mearns (p. 178) served as the district court’s expert in the 
long-running Cleveland school case. See infra Part II.C.2. See generally In 
Memoriam: Professor Edward A. Mearns, Jr., 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 
303 (2013). 
5. This reviewer is not entirely disconnected from the author of the book. One 
of the most nerve-wracking moments of my first year on the faculty occurred 
while the visiting committee was on campus. Judge Jones walked into my 
Property class while I was teaching a housing discrimination case. I was 
sure that he had forgotten more about fair housing law than I would ever 
know. Happily, Judge Jones thought the class went fine. I also have been 
the faculty coordinator of the Battisti lecture series for many years, so I 
know Judge Jones from his talk in that series, too. 
6. As Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, widow of Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, 
Jr., observes in the preface, “Reminiscent of a religious leader who answers 
God’s call to preach, Jones answered the call of Justice” (p. xi). 
7. Judge Jones does point out the importance of the church he attended during 
his formative years but gives no indication that he ever was drawn to the 
clergy (pp. 28–32). By contrast, Fred Gray—whose clients over the years 
have included Rosa Parks, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the victims of 
the infamous Tuskegee syphilis experiment—initially aimed to be a preacher 
of the gospel and was a part-time minister for nearly two decades after 
graduating from law school. Fred D. Gray, Bus Ride to Justice 269–
74 (rev. ed. 2013); see generally Symposium, In Honor of Fred Gray: Making 
Civil Rights Law from Rosa Parks to the Twenty-First Century, 67 Case 
W. Res. L. Rev. 1025 (2017). 
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justice at a time when segregation seemed to be firmly entrenched (pp. 
2–3).8 Invoking the document that catalyzed the founding of the 
NAACP reflects Judge Jones’s long connection with the organization, 
which dates to his teen years when he came under the wing of J. 
Maynard Dickerson, a black lawyer and entrepreneur in his hometown 
of Youngstown, Ohio, who headed the local NAACP as well as the Ohio 
State Conference of Branches (pp. 34–35, 45, 61). 
Dickerson got Jones involved in NAACP activities and made sure 
that the young man met national leaders, including executive secretary 
Walter White, assistant executive secretary Roy Wilkins (who later 
succeeded White in the top job), and other important figures (pp. 34, 
59). Jones became president of the local NAACP youth council, helping 
to organize a series of protests against racial discrimination in parks, 
restaurants, swimming pools, and other establishments (pp. 38–39, 49–
50, 54–55).9 The group even engaged in sit-ins at least a decade before 
the iconic Greensboro demonstration on February 1, 1960, stimulated 
hundreds of similar protests (pp. 54–55).10 All of these efforts achieved 
at least modest results. And as an undergraduate at what is now 
Youngstown State University after his service in the Army Air Corps 
during World War II, Jones organized a campus chapter of the NAACP 
that successfully challenged institutional discrimination (pp. 49–50). 
Along the way, he met an Antioch College student named A. Leon 
 
8. The issuance of “The Call” set in motion a series of events culminating in 
the creation of the NAACP. See Robert L. Jack, History of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
4–7 (1943); 1 Charles Flint Kellogg, NAACP: A History of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
12–45 (1967); Patricia Sullivan, Lift Every Voice: The NAACP and 
the Making of the Civil Rights Movement 6–16 (2009). 
9. Dickerson also allowed Jones, while still in junior high school, to write a 
sports column for the Buckeye Review, a weekly newspaper that the lawyer-
entrepreneur had established because the Youngstown Vindicator, the local 
daily newspaper, provided minimal coverage of the black community; 
Dickerson was unsparing in his criticism of his new writer but devoted 
enormous time and energy to mentoring the young man (pp. 40–41). Later, 
as a college student and for a time thereafter, Jones reported and wrote 
editorials for Dickerson’s Buckeye Review (pp. 48, 50, 55–57). 
10. The Youngstown sit-ins were by no means the first such demonstrations. 
The first sit-in took place in Chicago several years earlier, during World 
War II. See James Farmer, Lay Bare the Heart: An Autobiography 
of the Civil Rights Movement 105–08 (1985); August Meier & 
Elliott Rudwick, CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement, 
1942–1968, at 13–14 (1973). Similar protests occurred elsewhere during the 
war. See id. at 14–15. And other NAACP youth councils engaged in sit-ins 
before 1960. See Aldon D. Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights 
Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change 188–93 
(1984). 
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Higginbotham, Jr., who became a lifelong friend and distinguished 
judge, first on the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania and then on the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit.11 
Almost predictably, in light of his close relationship with Dickerson, 
Jones decided to go to law school. Especially influential in that decision 
was Culver v. City of Warren,12 a successful challenge to the segregation 
of a municipal swimming pool in a community near Youngstown. The 
city leased the pool in early 1947 to a newly formed veterans group that 
refused to allow African Americans to use the facility. The Ohio Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh District concluded that the veterans group 
was “a mere agent” of the city, so the whites-only policy was uncon-
stitutional.13 Of particular importance, Jones had the opportunity to sit 
in on strategy sessions with the lawyers who were handling the case and 
also with Thurgood Marshall, who was not formally involved in the lit-
igation but offered strategic advice to local counsel (pp. 62–65). 
His deep roots in the community prompted Jones to stay in town 
and enroll in the now-defunct night law school that was started by the 
local YMCA many years earlier and since had become affiliated with 
his undergraduate college (p. 58). One of his teachers there was a young 
lawyer named Frank Battisti (pp. 98, 171). During his first year, the 
mayor—at Maynard Dickerson’s behest—appointed Jones as director 
of the city’s Fair Employment Practices Committee (p. 64). He re-
mained in that position throughout his law school career and for a cou-
ple of years after he passed the bar exam, resigning in 1959 to open his 
own law office (pp. 77–78). After President John F. Kennedy took of-
fice, Dickerson began to lobby for Jones to get a job in the federal gov-
ernment. Those efforts paid off, and Jones became the first African 
American to serve as an Assistant United States Attorney in the 
Northern District of Ohio (pp. 82–84).14 
 
11. Judge Jones does not talk about his first meeting with Judge Higginbotham, 
but Judge Higginbotham’s widow, in the preface, mentions their close 
friendship (p. ix). Judge Jones does discuss their first meeting in a tribute 
that was published the year after Judge Higginbotham’s death. Nathaniel 
R. Jones, In Memoriam: A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., 112 Harv. L. Rev. 
1818, 1818 (1999). 
12. 83 N.E.2d 82 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948). 
13. Id. at 88, 93. For further details about this case, see Jeff Wiltse, 
Contested Waters: A Social History of Swimming Pools in 
America 159–62, 165–66 (2007). 
14. The U.S. Attorney in the Northern District of Ohio during the Eisenhower 
years explained his all-white professional staff by saying that he could not 
find qualified black lawyers (p. 83). President Kennedy appointed Merle M. 
McCurdy, an African American who was Cuyahoga County’s first public 
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After six years as an AUSA, Jones became an assistant general 
counsel of the Kerner Commission, which was established in the wake 
of the 1967 Detroit riots and other urban violence. In that position, he 
coordinated field teams to go to cities around the nation to obtain infor-
mation related to the urban violence that had occurred over the pre-
vious several years and to coordinate commission hearings (pp. 86–93).15 
The commission ultimately concluded that white racism was primarily 
responsible for the riots and urged public investment to improve social 
conditions (pp. 94–95).16 
Following his time in the U.S. Attorney’s office and with the Kerner 
Commission, Jones left federal service and returned to private law prac-
tice in Youngstown. There he resumed his leading role in local and state 
NAACP activities (p. 97). This period in Youngstown turned out to be 
a brief interlude. 
II 
A 
In late 1968, Lewis Steel, a staff lawyer in the NAACP’s national 
legal department, published an article in the New York Times Magazine 
that strongly criticized the Supreme Court’s record in civil rights 
cases.17 Steel contended that the Court historically had shown little 
sympathy for racial discrimination claims and continued to rule against 
such claims.18 Although the Court had rejected segregation in public 
 
defender, as his U.S. Attorney. McCurdy briefly delayed finalizing Jones’s 
appointment to discourage suggestions of racial favoritism (pp. 83–84). 
15. One notable episode concerned an uneventful staff interview with the 
entertainer Eartha Kitt that took place in the morning before a White 
House luncheon at which she got into a highly publicized argument with 
President Lyndon B. Johnson (pp. 90–93). 
16. See Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders (Bantam Books ed. 1968). 
17. Lewis M. Steel, Nine Men in Black Who Think White, N.Y. Times, Oct. 
13, 1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 56. 
18. Among the cases Steel mentioned by name or alluded to were Walker v. 
City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (upholding contempt convictions 
against Martin Luther King, Jr. and other activists who had defied an ex 
parte injunction prohibiting the Good Friday 1963 march in Birmingham); 
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (upholding trespassing convictions 
of demonstrators protesting the arrest of fellow civil rights demonstrators); 
and Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (rejecting a challenge to race-
based peremptory challenges to prospective jurors). Steel, supra note 17, at 
113–14. Although this does not affect the validity of Steel’s claim at the 
time he wrote, Swain was overruled more than two decades later by Batson 
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schools in Brown v. Board of Education,19 it had remanded the cases to 
the lower courts to formulate local remedies “with all deliberate 
speed,”20 which resulted in glacial progress toward desegregation.21 
Steel’s boss, NAACP general counsel Robert L. Carter, had reviewed 
the manuscript and found it “terrific.”22 The board of directors dis-
agreed. The next day, over Carter’s strenuous objection, the board fired 
Steel.23 The entire legal staff resigned in protest.24 
Soon afterward, Jones received an offer to succeed Carter as general 
counsel. This would be challenging for anyone, as Carter was something 
of a legend: he was a highly respected lawyer who had spent almost a 
quarter-century with the organization, where he played a major role in 
devising the legal strategy in the litigation campaign against segre-
gation and argued Brown in the Supreme Court (pp. 99–100). To his 
surprise, his mentor Dickerson strongly discouraged him from taking 
the job, but not because of the daunting prospect of replacing Carter 
(pp. 98–99). Dickerson was concerned that Jones would find it difficult 
to navigate the complex internal politics of the national organization. 
Jones says relatively little about those complexities, although he does 
discuss the controversy surrounding the Steel article (pp. 100–01) and 
 
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The other decisions retain their 
precedential status. 
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
20. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
21. Steel also explained that the Court had declined to review several important 
racial discrimination cases. Steel, supra note 17, at 113, 115. 
22. Robert L. Carter, A Matter of Law: A Memoir of Struggle in 
the Cause of Equal Rights 200 (2005). 
23. Id. at 200–02; N.A.A.C.P. Dismisses Lawyer Because of Article, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 15, 1968, at 53. Judge Jones, who was not present at these 
events in New York because they occurred while he was back in 
Youngstown, says that Carter refused the board’s order to fire Steel (p. 
101). That statement is inconsistent with Carter’s account, but resolving 
the discrepancy is beyond the scope of this review. 
24. Carter, supra note 22, at 202. In the end, both Carter and Steel did fine. 
Carter spent a year at Columbia University and three years as a partner in 
a law firm before being appointed to the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York, where he remained until his death in 
2012. Id. at 204, 207–08, 214–18; Roy Reed, Robert L. Carter, 94, Leading 
Strategist Against Segregation and U.S. Judge, Dies, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 
2012, at A17. Steel went on to a successful career as a civil rights lawyer in 
his own firm, where he partnered with one of the other NAACP staff 
lawyers who quit in response to his dismissal. See Diane Cardwell, City 
Agrees to Settlement in Parks Dept. Bias Case, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 2008, 
at B4; Douglas Martin, Richard Bellman, Lawyer, Dies at 74, N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 30, 2012, at A17; Lynda Richardson, For Civil Rights Lawyer, the 
Fight Is Far from Over, N.Y. Times, July 5, 2002, at B2. 
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also mentions the long-running tensions between the NAACP and the 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund that eventually culmi-
nated in litigation between the two organizations (p. 99).25 
Jones accepted the offer and spent the next ten years as the 
NAACP’s general counsel. The best parts of the book chronicle this 
period. Some of the stories are offbeat, such as how the NAACP came 
into possession of the ashes of the writer Dorothy Parker (pp. 114–17);26 
others are moving, such as how Clarence Norris, the last surviving 
Scottsboro defendant, received a pardon from Alabama Governor 
George Wallace forty-five years after he and eight other young men 
were falsely accused of raping two white women and sentenced to death 
(pp. 117–23).27 
 
25. See NAACP v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 753 F.2d 131 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985) (holding that the NAACP’s trademark-infringement suit against 
the LDF was barred by laches). For an NAACP perspective on the 
litigation, see Benjamin L. Hooks with Jerry Guess, The March for 
Civil Rights: The Benjamin Hooks Story 179–80 (2004). For an LDF 
perspective, see Coleman, supra note 1, at 321–22. 
 There were other internal political battles during Judge Jones’s tenure as 
general counsel. One involved the departure of Roy Wilkins as executive 
secretary, a process that was complicated by his awkward relationship with 
board chair Margaret Bush Wilson, who assumed that role on the death of 
her long-time predecessor. See Roy Wilkins with Tom Mathews, 
Standing Fast: The Autobiography of Roy Wilkins 340 (1982). And 
there was intense maneuvering during the process of selecting a new 
executive secretary after Wilkins retired. See Hooks, supra, at 128. 
 After Judge Jones went onto the bench, board chair Wilson was involved 
in ongoing controversy. In addition to the tension with Wilkins, she had a 
difficult relationship with Benjamin Hooks, the new executive director, and 
early in 1983 she unilaterally suspended him. Id. at 132–34; Sheila Rule, 
N.A.A.C.P. Officials Say Director Has Been Indefinitely Suspended, N.Y. 
Times, May 21, 1983, at 1. The full board overturned the suspension and 
removed Wilson as chair. Hooks, supra, at 134; Sheila Rule, Board of 
N.A.A.C.P. Calls for Resignation of Unit’s Chairman, N.Y. Times, May 
29, 1983, at 1. The following year, Thomas Atkins, who had succeeded Jones 
as general counsel, resigned that position. N.A.A.C.P.’s Counsel to Leave 
Office in July, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1984, at B9. Wilson had named Atkins 
as acting executive director when she suspended Hooks. Douglas C. McGill, 
Chairman of N.A.A.C.P. Says She Is ‘Unaware’ of Meeting, N.Y. Times, 
May 25, 1983, at A24. For more on Atkins, see infra notes 74–84 and 
accompanying text. 
26. Parker wrote for The New Yorker for many years. Among her best-known 
lines are: “Men seldom make passes at girls who wear glasses”; “Beauty is 
only skin deep, but ugly goes clean to the bone”; “Writing well is the best 
revenge”; and “If you want to know what God thinks of money, just look 
at the people he gave it to.” Her reaction to the death of the famously 
taciturn ex-President Calvin Coolidge reportedly was: “How can they tell?” 
27. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (overturning Norris’s second 
conviction and death penalty because African Americans had been excluded 
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B 
The heart of the discussion emphasizes the NAACP’s litigation 
against segregated schools not just in the South but also in the North 
and West. Judge Jones succinctly discusses legal strategy and school 
desegregation cases. This section focuses on strategy; the next section 
addresses some of the cases, especially those in Boston and Cleveland. 
The discussion of strategy effectively reviews how Charles Hamilton 
Houston and his disciple Thurgood Marshall conducted the legal attack 
on segregated schools. That discussion might have made explicit that 
Houston’s early emphasis on “the failure to make ‘separate’ truly 
‘equal’” (p. 128) focused on southern and border states which provided 
no graduate or professional programs for African Americans.28 The issue 
was not “separate but equal”; instead, it was “separate and nonsexist-
ent.”29 The first victories came in states that operated whites-only law 
schools and offered to subsidize African Americans who went to out-of-
state law schools.30 But by 1950, in Sweatt v. Painter,31 one of the last 
of the pre-Brown graduate and professional school cases, the NAACP 
was attacking the constitutionality of segregation head-on (p. 129).32 
From that point onward, the organization steadfastly committed itself 
to promoting school desegregation (pp. 130–33). 
 
from the jury); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (overturning the 
convictions and death penalties in the first Scottsboro trials because the 
defendants had been denied the right to counsel); see generally Dan T. 
Carter, Scottsboro: A Tragedy of the American South (rev. ed. 
2007); James Goodman, Stories of Scottsboro (1994). 
28. See Mark V. Tushnet, The NAACP’s Legal Strategy against 
Segregated Education, 1925–1950, at 174 n.5 (1987). 
29. Id. at 36. 
30. See Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590 (Md. 1936); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. 
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). One minor quibble: Judge Jones says that 
Lloyd Gaines was admitted to the previously all-white University of 
Missouri Law School following the Supreme Court ruling in his case (p. 
128). In fact, the Court ordered his admission “in the absence of other and 
proper provision for his legal training within [Missouri].” 305 U.S. at 352. 
The state responded by establishing a new law school at its all-black Lincoln 
University. Gaines disappeared before the trial court could conduct a 
hearing on whether the new school was substantially equal to the all-white 
law school at the University of Missouri. Sullivan, supra note 8, at 233; 
Tushnet, supra note 28, at 73–74. 
31. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
32. At trial, Thurgood Marshall made a detailed record showing that the law 
school at the newly created Texas State University for Negroes was vastly 
inferior to the all-white University of Texas Law School. See Jonathan L. 
Entin, Sweatt v. Painter, the End of Segregation, and the Transformation 
of Education Law, 5 Rev. Litig. 3, 31–39 (1986). 
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This commitment to integrated schools generated controversy in 
later years. Judge Jones reviews the conflict between the NAACP’s na-
tional office and its Atlanta branch when the local group endorsed a 
plan that provided for more black administrators and less desegregation 
of student bodies (pp. 136–43).33 Meanwhile, Derrick Bell, the noted 
Harvard law professor and former staff lawyer with the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund, began to question the wisdom of single-
minded pursuit of integration.34 Judge Jones responded to Professor Bell 
at the time and does so again in his memoir (pp. 143–46).35 
This controversy reflected a long-running debate within the 
NAACP that dated back to the 1930s. After documenting massive dis-
parities between white and black schools under segregation, the organ-
ization considered two different legal strategies: equalization of the 
separate schools and a direct attack on the constitutionality of segre-
gated schools.36 That conversation was part of a broader argument 
about whether segregation afforded opportunities to promote distinctive 
black institutions and provided means of social and economic mobility 
for black professionals, or whether segregation served to oppress and 
dehumanize African Americans.37 The education debate specifically 
focused on the fate of black teachers and principals who might lose their 
jobs under desegregation because white parents almost certainly would 
object to black faculty and administrators for their children, and on the 
uncertain treatment that black children could expect in desegregated 
schools.38 One notable skeptic, W.E.B. Du Bois, argued that “the Negro 
 
33. After protracted litigation, the so-called Atlanta Compromise was upheld 
in court. See Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 717 (5th Cir.), reh’g denied, 525 
F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1975). For a detailed account of the controversy, see 
Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Courage to Dissent: Atlanta and the Long 
History of the Civil Rights Movement 357–408 (2011). 
34. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and 
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470 
(1976); see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the 
Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518 (1980). 
35. See Nathaniel R. Jones, Correspondence, School Desegregation, 86 Yale 
L.J. 378 (1976). For Professor Bell’s reply, see id. at 382. 
36. See Genna Rae McNeil, Groundwork: Charles Hamilton Houston 
and the Struggle for Civil Rights 113–15 (1983); Sullivan, supra 
note 8, at 130–31, 156–57; Tushnet, supra note 28, at 5–6, 13–14, 25–28. 
37. See McNeil, supra note 36, at 116–17; Sullivan, supra note 8, at 198–202; 
Tushnet, supra note 28, at 8–10. 
38. See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 123–26, 128–31; Tushnet, supra note 28, 
at 111–13. 
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needs neither segregated schools nor mixed schools. What he needs is 
Education.”39 
To be sure, some of the early NAACP cases could be viewed as 
furthering an equalization approach. Those cases challenged, with 
mixed success, race-based salary disparities for public school teachers.40 
But, as noted earlier, the organization committed to the direct attack 
in the years leading up to Brown.41 While there were some skeptics in 
the black community, the NAACP’s support of the direct attack re-
flected the clear majority view among African Americans.42 Several 
decades later, the situation seemed more complicated when the Atlanta 
flap arose and Professor Bell questioned the presumptive valorization 
of integration. What would it mean to “integrate” a school system in 
which more than 85 percent of the students were African American?43 
Judge Jones and the national NAACP kept faith in integration; they 
sought a metropolitan remedy that would involve the overwhelmingly 
white suburban schools. Indeed, Judge Jones was arguing for precisely 
that remedy in Detroit and believed that the Atlanta dissidents were 
undercutting his position (pp. 137, 142). Although Jones substantially 
prevailed on that issue in the lower courts,44 the Supreme Court re-
versed and rejected a metropolitan remedy in Milliken v. Bradley.45 
That ruling made it extremely difficult to include suburban districts in 
any desegregation remedy and profoundly shaped the scope of relief in 
other school cases. 
 
39. W.E. Burghardt Du Bois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. 
Negro Educ. 328, 335 (1935). For more on Du Bois’s skepticism about 
integration, which contributed to his resignation from the NAACP staff, see 
David Levering Lewis, W.E.B. Du Bois: The Fight for Equality 
and the American Century, 1919–1963, at 330–44 (2000). 
40. The salary-equalization litigation campaign won a few notable cases. See, 
e.g., Alston v. Sch. Bd., 112 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1940); Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 
30 F. Supp. 245 (D. Md. 1939). But many other cases failed because 
plaintiffs could not prove that salary disparities were race-based even 
though black teachers received disproportionately low compensation. See 
Tushnet, supra note 28, at 92–93, 96–97. 
41. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
42. See Tushnet, supra note 28, at 151–55. 
43. See Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 717, 718 (5th Cir. 1975). 
44. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 250–52, 258 (6th Cir. 1973), rev’d, 418 
U.S. 717 (1974). 
45. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
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C 
When Brown was decided, segregation was required by law only in 
the South and some Border States.46 In the early 1960s, the NAACP 
under Robert Carter began to argue that children in urban schools with 
overwhelmingly black enrollment suffered the same harms as black 
children in schools that were segregated by law.47 But the courts recog-
nized a distinction between de jure segregation and de facto segregation, 
racial imbalances that do not directly arise from discrimination by 
government.48 Although Judge Jones regards the distinction as a 
“fiction” (p. 152), he points out that challenges based only on de facto 
segregation generally failed (pp. 152–53).49 This meant that successful 
challenges would require proof of official actions or policies that sought 
to promote racial separation in education. And the Supreme Court 
 
46. Many jurisdictions elsewhere in the nation had required segregated schools 
in earlier times. A notable example is Massachusetts, where the state 
supreme court upheld school segregation in a notorious pre-Civil War 
ruling. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850). The 
Supreme Court relied on this case in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 
(1896), even though the legislature effectively overruled the decision shortly 
after it came down. See 1855 Mass. Acts 674 (prohibiting racially segregated 
schools). That legislation did not resolve the matter. See infra Part II.C.1. 
47. Carter, supra note 22, at 171–72, 191–92; J. Anthony Lukas, Common 
Ground: A Turbulent Decade in the Lives of Three American 
Families 234 (1985). 
48. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17–18 
(1971); Offermann v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22, 24 (2d Cir. 1967); Webb v. 
Bd. of Educ., 223 F. Supp. 466, 468 (N.D. Ill. 1963). 
49. As representative examples, he cites cases from Cleveland and Cincinnati: 
Craggett v. Bd. of Educ., 234 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ohio), aff’d, 338 F.2d 941 
(6th Cir. 1964); and Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 244 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. 
Ohio 1965), aff’d, 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), appeal after remand, 419 
F.2d 1387 (6th Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court effectively rejected the 
notion that de facto segregation was unconstitutional. See Pasadena City 
Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436 (1976) (explaining that school 
districts have no duty to respond to the “quite normal pattern of human 
migration” that affects the racial composition of their schools). Although de 
facto segregation claims ultimately failed, a demonstration against the 
phenomenon did lead to a Supreme Court decision that broadened First 
Amendment rights. Activist-comedian Dick Gregory led a peaceful march 
to the neighborhood of Mayor Richard J. Daley demanding more aggressive 
policies to combat de facto segregation in the Chicago public schools. 
Confronted by hostile spectators, Gregory and his fellow marchers were 
arrested for disorderly conduct when they refused a police order to disperse. 
T. Rees Shapiro, Dick Gregory (1932–2017): His Searing Punchlines 
Landed Hard, Wash. Post, Aug. 21, 2017, at A1, A2. The Supreme Court 
unanimously reversed the convictions. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 
111, 113 (1969). 
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made clear in Keyes v. School District No. 1,50 which arose in Denver, 
that a school district that never was required to operate segregated 
schools nevertheless could be held liable for running “a systematic pro-
gram of segregation affecting a substantial portion of the students, 
schools, teachers, and facilities within the school system.”51 
He chronicles many cases in which the NAACP brought de jure 
segregation claims in the North and West. These efforts had mixed 
success. The discussion includes lawsuits involving Detroit (pp. 156–
65),52 Dayton (pp. 165–69),53 Grand Rapids (pp. 179–81),54 and 
Youngstown (pp. 179–83).55 The latter case, involving Judge Jones’s 
hometown school district, was especially frustrating because the district 
court “refused to recognize the cumulative effect of segregative acts” 
(p. 181) and the court of appeals accepted that “flawed analytical 
process” (p. 182). 
This section focuses on two of the cases that Judge Jones addresses. 
The Boston case attracted widespread national—and even interna-
tional—attention and is worthy of separate consideration for that 
reason alone. But the case also introduces Thomas I. Atkins, who 
played a prominent role in that litigation and, with Judge Jones’s en-
thusiastic support, succeeded him as NAACP general counsel. So the 
next section provides a somewhat broader background perspective on 
Boston than Judge Jones can provide in a memoir and also some addi-
tional details about Atkins.56 Following the Boston discussion, attention 
turns to the Cleveland school case. That controversy never achieved 
the notoriety of the Boston situation, but it remains a subject of intense 
local interest and has several connections to this law school.57 
 
50. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
51. Id. at 201. 
52. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), appeal after remand, 433 U.S. 267 
(1977) (affirming remedy following the Court’s previous rejection of a 
metropolitan remedy). 
53. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979). 
54. Higgins v. Bd. of Educ., 395 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Mich. 1973), aff’d, 508 
F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974). 
55. Alexander v. Youngstown Bd. of Educ., 454 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ohio 1978), 
aff’d, 675 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1982). 
56. I met Tom Atkins for the first time in May 1963, when he was introduced 
as the new executive secretary of the Boston branch of the NAACP, and 
worked on various projects in which he was involved over the next several 
years. We also remained in touch for a long time after both of us left the 
Boston area, although we had not spoken in quite a while when he died in 
2008. 
57. In addition to Professor Mearns’s role as the district court’s special expert 
in that case, see supra note 4, two longtime members of our adjunct faculty 
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1 
No school desegregation lawsuit receives more space—nearly a 
dozen pages—than the Boston case (pp. 191–201). Judge Jones likens 
the resistance to desegregation in that bastion of liberalism to Little 
Rock (pp. 191, 197). Some readers might find it a bit difficult to follow 
the chronology of the litigation, because the discussion focuses only 
briefly on the ruling by Judge W. Arthur Garrity that found the Boston 
public schools to be unconstitutionally segregated (pp. 194–95). Most 
of the Boston section addresses the work of the legal team that litigated 
the case (pp. 192–93), the resistance to the Phase I remedy (pp. 196–
97), and the opposition of President Gerald R. Ford and his adminis-
tration to the so-called “forced busing” of students as part of that rem-
edy (pp. 197–201). 
After nearly two years of litigation, Judge Garrity issued a compre-
hensive ruling on liability in June 1974. In Morgan v. Hennigan,58 he 
found that school authorities had deliberately segregated the system by 
maintaining overcrowded, predominantly white schools while also op-
erating underutilized, predominantly black schools;59 changed attend-
ance zones to perpetuate segregation;60 manipulated the factors used to 
assign students to high schools;61 implemented transfer policies that pro-
 
clerked for Judge Battisti at different stages of the litigation. Dan McMullen 
and Dennis Terez later published articles in this review that addressed in 
broader terms some issues that arose during the case. See Daniel J. 
McMullen & Irene Hirata McMullen, Stubborn Facts of History—The 
Vestiges of Past Discrimination in School Desegregation Cases, 44 Case 
W. Res. L. Rev. 75 (1993); Dennis G. Terez, Protecting the Remedy of 
Unitary Schools, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 41 (1986). McMullen served as 
the court’s school desegregation monitor following his clerkship and, after 
Battisti’s death, as special master. See Ronnie A. Dunn et al., 
Boycotts, Busing, and Beyond: The History and Implications of 
School Desegregation in the Urban North 142 (2016); McMullen & 
McMullen, supra, at 75 n.†; Richard B. Saphire, Bringing Brown to 
Cleveland, in Justice and Legal Change on the Shores of Lake Erie: 
A History of the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio 127, 157 nn.78 & 88 (Paul Finkelman & Roberta Sue 
Alexander eds., 2012). Terez later served for more than a decade as the 
Federal Public Defender for the Northern District of Ohio; for nearly two 
years, he also was the Acting Federal Public Defender for the Southern 
District of Ohio. 
58. 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass.), aff’d sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 
580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). 
59. Id. at 425–27. School authorities refused to assign students in overcrowded 
white schools to available seats in black schools. Id. at 427–32. 
60. Id. at 432–41. 
61. Id. at 441–49. 
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moted segregation;62 assigned African-American teachers to predomi-
nantly black schools that also had less experienced teachers and greater 
faculty turnover than predominantly white schools;63 and intentionally 
segregated the city’s specialized high schools and vocational programs.64 
The Phase I remedy called for cross-busing between Roxbury, the heart 
of Boston’s black community, and South Boston, the city’s most self-
consciously Irish neighborhood. The highly publicized violent resistance 
during Phase I took place in South Boston (p. 196). Judge Garrity de-
vised a more comprehensive Phase II remedy that applied to the entire 
city and went into effect the following year.65 Phase II elicited even 
more resistance than Phase I; the case went on for another two decades.66 
Because he is writing a memoir rather than a comprehensive ac-
count of the Boston school litigation, Judge Jones understandably elides 
many of these details. But it is important to recognize that this dispute 
actually arose nearly a dozen years before Judge Garrity’s ruling on lia-
bility and his Phase I order in 1974. This is especially significant be-
cause Thomas Atkins, whose role in the Boston case and others comes 
in for high praise (pp. 192–93, 194), was a principal actor in the earlier 
events. 
The path to Morgan began in June 1963, when the local NAACP 
asked the Boston School Committee to address the problem of de facto 
segregation. The Committee, chaired by Louise Day Hicks, refused to 
do so.67 Civil rights advocates responded by picketing school head-
quarters and organizing a one-day boycott of junior and senior high 
schools.68 Matters further deteriorated over the next several months. 
Mrs. Hicks won an overwhelming victory in the November city election, 
receiving more votes than every other candidate for local office, in-
cluding a popular incumbent mayor who easily won reelection.69 
 
62. Id. at 449–56. 
63. Id. at 459–66. 
64. Id. at 466–69. 
65. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), aff’d, 530 F.2d 401 
(1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. White v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 935 (1976). 
66. See Morgan v. Gittens, 915 F. Supp. 457 (D. Mass. 1996) (awarding 
attorneys’ fees following entry of final judgment). 
67. Ronald P. Formisano, Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and 
Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s, at 28–29 (1991); Lukas, supra note 
47, at 124–26; Jim Vrabel, A People’s History of the New Boston 
51–52 (2014). 
68. Formisano, supra note 67, at 29; Lukas, supra note 47, at 127; Vrabel, 
supra note 67, at 53–54. 
69. Formisano, supra note 67, at 31; Lukas, supra note 47, at 129; Vrabel, 
supra note 67, at 57. Mrs. Hicks, the daughter of a prominent lawyer, judge, 
and business figure for whom a major thoroughfare in South Boston is 
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Two years later, the legislature approved the Racial Imbalance 
Law,70 which sought to force Boston to address the issue of de facto seg-
regation. The School Committee strenuously opposed the measure. In 
November 1965, Mrs. Hicks and her allies swept to another strong vic-
tory; the only member who had expressed any sympathy for the 
NAACP’s position was defeated.71 The Committee resisted the law for 
the next nine years, losing millions of dollars in both state and federal 
education money.72 The Morgan lawsuit was filed in March 1972 as a 
de jure segregation claim.73 
Thomas Atkins, whom Judge Jones effusively praises as “one of the 
brightest and most courageous individuals” he dealt with during his 
 
named, had been elected to the School Committee as a reformer in 1961. 
Formisano, supra note 67, at 30; Lukas, supra note 47, at 116–17, 123. 
Despite her persistent hostility to claims of de facto segregation, she had 
belonged to a law school study group that included three African-American 
members. Id. at 119. Although widely regarded as a bigot based not only 
on her rejection of the NAACP’s position but also on her campaign slogan—
“You know where I stand,” id. at 134—Mrs. Hicks never made the sort of 
racially charged statements that some of her School Committee colleagues 
did. See id. at 132. And she rebuffed Alabama Governor George Wallace 
during his insurgent campaign for the 1964 Democratic presidential 
nomination and his independent run for the presidency in 1968. Id. at 128, 
135. 
 Wallace also might have operated in part out of political opportunism. He 
began as an active supporter of the liberal Big Jim Folsom. Dan T. 
Carter, The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of 
the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American 
Politics 69, 81–82 (1995); Marshall Frady, Wallace 98–99, 106–07 
(enlarged and updated ed. 1976). He served as a trial judge for several years 
during this period. Civil rights lawyer Fred Gray, who had many subsequent 
run-ins with the man, reports that Judge Wallace treated him with courtesy 
and respect. Gray, supra note 7, at 131, 137. Wallace broke with Folsom 
in 1956 over civil rights. Carter, supra, at 84–85; Frady, supra, at 108–
09. But after he lost the 1958 gubernatorial primary to a hard-core 
segregationist, Wallace vowed never again to be outflanked on racial issues. 
Carter, supra, at 96 & n.*; Frady, supra, at 127. Years later, in his last 
campaign, Wallace sought forgiveness from civil rights activists who 
generally accepted his repentance. Carter, supra, at 460–62; Gray, supra 
note 7, at 350. 
70. Ch. 641, 1965 Mass. Acts 414 (codified as amended at Mass. Gen. Laws 
Ann. ch. 71, §§ 37C–37D (West 2009)).  
71. Formisano, supra note 67, at 39; Lukas, supra note 47, at 130–31; 
Vrabel, supra note 67, at 57. 
72. Formisano, supra note 67, at 44–47, 49, 53; Lukas, supra note 47, at 132; 
Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410, 420–21 (D. Mass.), aff’d sub nom. 
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 
963 (1975). 
73. Formisano, supra note 67, at 53–54; Lukas, supra note 47, at 219. 
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NAACP career (p. 194), played a significant role in Boston throughout 
these events.74 A Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Indiana University, where 
he was the first African-American student body president, Atkins en-
tered a Ph.D. program at Harvard in 1961.75 He wrote a seminar paper 
that severely criticized the Boston branch of the NAACP; the branch 
responded by hiring him as executive secretary in May 1963, shortly 
before the organization raised the de facto segregation issue with the 
School Committee.76 He briefly served as business manager for Boston 
Celtics star Bill Russell, whose enterprises included a popular Roxbury 
restaurant and a rubber plantation in Liberia, before enrolling at 
Harvard Law School in the fall of 1966.77 In June 1967, shortly after the 
end of his first year, Atkins played a key role in tamping down Boston’s 
first significant racial violence but got into an altercation with a white 
police officer while trying to protect a black reporter who was covering 
the events.78 
That episode did not prevent him from running for office later in 
the year. In November 1967, during his third semester in law school, 
Atkins became the first African American ever elected to an at-large 
seat on the Boston City Council.79 Soon after taking office, Atkins bro-
 
74. Judge Jones also notes Atkins’s deep involvement in other desegregation 
lawsuits, especially the Cleveland case (pp. 173–74). See infra Part II.C.2. 
75. Hillel Levine & Lawrence Harmon, The Death of an American 
Jewish Community: A Tragedy of Good Intentions 100 (1992); 
Vrabel, supra note 67, at 54; Eric Moskowitz & Mark Feeney, Civil Rights 
Trailblazer Atkins Dies at 69, Bos. Globe, June 29, 2008, at A1, A16. 
Atkins not only was the first black student body president at Indiana 
University, he was the first African American to hold that office at any Big 
10 university. Vrabel, supra note 67, at 54; Moskowitz & Feeney, supra, 
at A16. 
76. Levine & Harmon, supra note 75, at 100; Vrabel, supra note 67, at 54. 
77. Levine & Harmon, supra note 75, at 100–01. 
78. See id. at 98–99, 102–03; Editorial, Thanks to Thomas Atkins, Bos. Globe, 
Nov. 7, 1997, at A26. 
79. Moskowitz & Feeney, supra note 75, at A1. Judge Jones suggests that 
Atkins was the first black person ever elected to council (p. 192), but one 
African American briefly represented Roxbury in 1951. Here is what 
happened: For most of the twentieth century, members of the Boston City 
Council were elected at large. For a time, however, members were elected 
from wards. See Edward C. Banfield & James Q. Wilson, City 
Politics 94 (1963). In 1949, a black lawyer named Lawrence Banks won a 
close vote in his ward. Because of a protracted contest of the result, Banks 
served only the last few months of his term. See Banks v. Election Comm’rs, 
99 N.E.2d 755 (Mass. 1951); Levine & Harmon, supra note 75, at 107. At 
that 1949 election, the voters also abolished district-based seats and 
returned to an at-large City Council that remained all-white until Atkins 
won his seat in 1967. See Banfield & Wilson, supra, at 94; Lukas, supra 
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kered a complex deal that allowed a James Brown concert to go on the 
night after Martin Luther King’s assassination and to have the concert 
televised in a successful effort to minimize violence in the city.80 He was 
easily reelected in 1969, finishing second behind only Louise Day Hicks 
in an eighteen-candidate field.81 In 1971 he ran for mayor but lost in 
the primary; the governor of Massachusetts then appointed him Secre-
tary of Communities and Development.82 He went on to operate his own 
civil rights law firm and was president of the Boston branch of the 
NAACP from 1974 until he succeeded Judge Jones as general counsel 
of the national NAACP in 1980.83 Meanwhile, he served as lead counsel 
in the Cleveland case.84 
2 
The Cleveland school case, Reed v. Rhodes,85 also receives 
substantial attention from Judge Jones (pp. 169–79). Here he provides 
 
note 47, at 60; Alan Lupo, Liberty’s Chosen Home 89 (2d ed. 1988); 
James Q. Wilson, Negro Politics 32 (1960). 
80. Levine & Harmon, supra note 75, at 143–45; Lukas, supra note 47, at 
32–35; Moskowitz & Feeney, supra note 75, at A16. 
81. Levine & Harmon, supra note 75, at 271. Mrs. Hicks had narrowly lost 
the 1967 mayoral election and was defeated by a wider margin when she 
sought the position again in 1971. Lukas, supra note 47, at 136–37; Lupo, 
supra note 79, at 113, 115. 
82. Moskowitz & Feeney, supra note 75, at A16. 
83. See id. As a private lawyer before his tenure as NAACP general counsel, 
Atkins substantially participated in school desegregation cases around the 
nation. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 451 
(1979); United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 637 F.2d 1101, 1103 (7th Cir. 
1980); Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1279 (8th Cir. 1980); Bradley 
v. Milliken, 620 F.2d 1143, 1144 (6th Cir. 1980); Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. 
Dirs., 616 F.2d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1980), overruled in part by Felzen v. 
Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1998); S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified 
Sch. Dist., 484 F. Supp. 657, 659 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Berry v. Sch. Dist., 467 
F. Supp. 630, 632 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Alexander v. Youngstown Bd. of 
Educ., 454 F. Supp. 985, 986 (N.D. Ohio 1978), aff’d, 675 F.2d 787 (6th 
Cir. 1982). 
84. See infra Part II.C.2. 
85. 422 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ohio 1976), remanded mem. for reconsideration, 
559 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1977), adhered to on remand, 455 F. Supp. 546 
(N.D. Ohio) (reaffirming finding of liability), relief ordered, 455 F. Supp. 
569 (N.D. Ohio 1978), aff’d and remanded, 607 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1979). 
This case, like Morgan in Boston, went on for another two decades. The 
parties entered into a consent decree in 1994, Reed v. Rhodes, 869 F. Supp. 
1274 (N.D. Ohio 1994), and the district court—over the plaintiffs’ 
objections—concluded that the Cleveland Metropolitan School District had 
attained unitary status several years later, Reed v. Rhodes, 1 F. Supp. 2d 
705 (N.D. Ohio 1998), aff’d per curiam, 215 F.3d 1327 (6th Cir. 2000). 
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more background than for Boston and the other school cases, although 
the main focus remains on legal strategy rather than on the events that 
led to the filing of the lawsuit. He explains that Reed was filed several 
years after a failed challenge to de facto segregation in Cleveland, 
Craggett v. Board of Education,86 and that this affected the legal strat-
egy that the NAACP would pursue in the later lawsuit (pp. 169–70). 
But a more detailed account of the Craggett dispute can put Reed into 
broader perspective. 
That dispute arose from the official response to overcrowding in 
predominantly African-American schools. Beginning in 1955, the board 
of education operated so-called relay classes, or double sessions, at those 
schools: half the pupils attended school in the morning, the other half 
in the afternoon; none of the children received a full day’s worth of in-
struction.87 Under pressure from protesting parents, in January 1962 
the board began to bus black children from their overcrowded neighbor-
hood schools to nearby, overwhelmingly white schools that had space. 
But this arrangement was correctly described as “intact busing”: the 
African-American children were almost completely separated from the 
white pupils at the receiving schools.88 
Meanwhile, the board of education authorized a crash program to 
build three new schools to relieve overcrowding in the predominantly 
black buildings. That would reinforce existing patterns of racial isola-
tion and led to the emergence of the United Freedom Movement, a 
broad civil rights coalition, in the summer of 1963.89 UFM tried unsuc-
cessfully to negotiate with the board through the fall to integrate the 
schools.90 Beginning in January 1964, UFM staged demonstrations at 
district headquarters, white schools that were receiving black children 
under the intact-busing program, and sites of the proposed new 
schools.91 Tragedy struck on April 7, when Bruce Klunder, a young 
white minister who was vice-chair of the Cleveland chapter of the 
Congress of Racial Equality, was killed when he was accidentally run 
 
86. 234 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ohio), aff’d, 338 F.2d 941 (6th Cir. 1964); see supra 
note 49 and accompanying text. 
87. Reed, 422 F. Supp. at 782–83; Dunn et al., supra note 57, at 58, 108, 137; 
Nishani Frazier, Harambee City: The Congress of Racial 
Equality in Cleveland and the Rise of Black Power Populism 82 
(2017). 
88. Reed, 422 F. Supp. at 783; Dunn et al., supra note 57, at 60–63, 108, 138; 
Frazier, supra note 87, at 83–84. 
89. Dunn et al., supra note 57, at 64–65, 108; Frazier, supra note 87, at 80–
81. 
90. Dunn et al., supra note 57, at 65–66; Frazier, supra note 87, at 84–85. 
91. Dunn et al., supra note 57, at 66–69, 108–09; Frazier, supra note 87, at 
87–91; Meier & Rudwick, supra note 10, at 248–49. 
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over by a bulldozer while protesting at the site where one of the new 
schools was under construction.92 Craggett was filed soon afterward and 
sought a preliminary injunction to block construction of the three 
schools. The district court denied relief, finding that the board did not 
seek to promote segregation but simply was adhering to longstanding 
policies favoring neighborhood schools.93 
The Cleveland branch of the NAACP continued to press for school 
integration over the next several years, but both the board of education 
and Superintendent of Schools Paul Briggs insisted that the racial con-
centration in enrollment reflected neighborhood housing patterns rather 
than a deliberate policy of segregating children by race (p. 171).94 Jones 
and local counsel tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a plan for desegre-
gating the schools, but when the talks broke down the NAACP filed 
the Reed complaint in December 1973 (pp. 170–71). 
The case was assigned to Chief Judge Frank J. Battisti of the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. Two 
details about Judge Battisti are worth noting. First, Judge Battisti also 
had some other high-profile civil rights matters on his docket (p. 171): 
a housing discrimination case that the United States Department of 
Justice had filed against the virtually all-white suburb of Parma several 
months earlier,95 and a dispute over the location and operation of public 
 
92. Dunn et al., supra note 57, at 70, 109; Frazier, supra note 87, at 95–96; 
Meier & Rudwick, supra note 10, at 249. For more on Klunder’s 
involvement with CORE and the civil rights movement, see Frazier, supra 
note 87, at 64–65, 68–71; Meier & Rudwick, supra note 10, at 242. 
93. Craggett v. Bd. of Educ., 234 F. Supp. 381, 386–87 (N.D. Ohio 1964). The 
district court also observed that the plaintiffs had not filed suit until “many 
months” after the board of education had approved the construction 
program, id. at 385, a point emphasized by the court of appeals in affirming 
the denial of injunctive relief, 338 F.2d 941, 941–42 (6th Cir. 1964). 
94. Superintendent Briggs had taken office several months after Rev. Klunder’s 
death. See Dunn et al., supra note 57, at 84; supra note 92 and 
accompanying text. Briggs enjoyed broad support for most of his fourteen-
year tenure, but his performance came in for notable criticism after he 
resigned in 1978. William D. Henderson, Demography and Desegregation in 
the Cleveland Public Schools: Toward a Comprehensive Theory of 
Educational Failure and Success, 26 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 457, 
502–03 (2001). 
95. See United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio), relief 
granted, 504 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Ohio 1980), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 
661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir.) (reversing only the district court’s appointment of 
a special master but affirming the judgment on liability and remedy in all 
other respects), rehearing en banc denied, 669 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1981). 
See generally W. Dennis Keating, The Suburban Racial Dilemma: 
Housing and Neighborhoods 140–51 (1994); Saphire, supra note 57, at 
145–48. The filing of the complaint in 1973 generated satellite litigation that 
delayed the resolution of the case by several years. See, e.g., Cornelius v. 
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housing in and around Cleveland.96 Second, as noted above, Judge 
Battisti had taught Jones in law school two decades previously (pp. 98, 
171).97 This prompted baseless accusations that Judge Battisti should 
have recused himself.98 
Of greater significance, Jones recounts the skepticism with which 
the Reed lawsuit was greeted by some influential local African-
Americans (pp. 173–74). Shortly before the trial began, the publisher 
of the Call and Post, Cleveland’s venerable black newspaper, organized 
a meeting at which Jones and his legal team could discuss the case with 
African-American community leaders. That group refused to speak with 
the white members of the legal team; the Call and Post publisher 
declared: “This is a black meeting” (p. 173). The black lawyers, includ-
ing Jones and lead counsel Thomas Atkins, reluctantly accepted this 
condition and, after their white colleagues departed, faced a deeply 
skeptical audience. Judge Jones says only that, in the end, at least some 
of the initially hostile community leaders were persuaded not to oppose 
the lawsuit (p. 174). He does not speculate about why the leaders 
refused to meet with the white lawyers, nor does he explain the basis 
for the group’s skepticism about the litigation. The latter point is par-
ticularly intriguing, because that skepticism about seeking integration 
of the Cleveland schools seems quite similar to the black opposition to 
school desegregation in Atlanta that was unfolding at about the same 
 
City of Parma, 374 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Ohio), vacated and remanded, 506 
F.2d 1400 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 1052 (1975); 
City of Parma v. Levi, 536 F.2d 133 (6th Cir. 1976). 
96. See Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 355 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. 
Ohio) (three-judge court), on remand to single judge, 355 F. Supp. 1257 
(N.D. Ohio 1973), rev’d and remanded, 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974); 
Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v. City of Cleveland, 342 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. 
Ohio 1972), aff’d sub nom. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Harmody, 474 
F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1973); Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 
1972), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973) (mem.). 
See generally Saphire, supra note 57, at 144–45. 
97. See supra text following note 13. 
98. Henderson, supra note 94, at 501. It is difficult to take seriously any 
suggestion that a judge must recuse from a case in which a long-ago former 
student represents a party. This hardly qualifies as a circumstance in which 
the judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 455(a) (2012). A judicial clerk typically has a much closer connection with 
a judge than a law student has with any professor, but a judge is not 
expected to recuse when a former clerk participates in a case. For example, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist called one of his former clerks by her first name 
during oral argument in a high-profile case. See Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 34, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241). In 
the same case, Justice Stevens referred to an amici brief by the name of one 
of his former clerks who had written the brief rather than by reference to 
any of the amici. See id. at 19. 
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time.99 It is possible that many of the leaders shared the view of Arnold 
Pinkney, the president of the board of education and one of the African-
American influentials who attended the meeting, that improving the 
quality of the schools was more important than integrating them at 
that point.100 But the book does not address this question. 
Judge Jones does provide a detailed summary of Judge Battisti’s 
findings, including more than 200 instances of intentional discrimi-
nation (pp. 175–76), and his remedial order (p. 177). He also alludes to 
the challenges that arose during the implementation phase of the case, 
notably the 1985 suicide of a relatively new superintendent of schools, 
Frederick D. Holliday, who shot himself on a Saturday morning in one 
of the city’s high schools (p. 179). Indeed, so recalcitrant were the school 
authorities and much of the public that Judge Jones describes 
Cleveland as second only to Boston in terms of contention and bitter-
ness (p. 171). Other than the Holliday suicide, he does not carry the 
discussion much beyond 1979, when the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed Judge Battisti’s rulings on liability and 
remedy;101 he bowed out of the case after President Carter announced 
that he was nominating Jones for a seat on the Sixth Circuit (p. 179). 
III 
Judge Jones devotes nearly a full chapter to describing the process 
that led to his ascension to the bench. The possibility of an appointment 
arose in June 1978, when he was contacted by a member of President 
Carter’s judicial selection commission for the Sixth Circuit, as it hap-
pens on the day that the Supreme Court handed down its first major 
affirmative action decision in Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke (pp. 210–11).102 Nearly eleven months later, at a White House 
ceremony commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of Brown, 
President Carter announced his intention to nominate Jones (pp. 217–
18). The confirmation process went uneventfully, and Judge Jones took 
the bench to hear his first set of cases on October 15, 1979, the day he 
took his oath (pp. 222–24). 
He does not discuss many of his cases on the bench. Explaining why 
he wrote this memoir, he alludes to the Sixth Circuit’s en banc decision 
in an affirmative action case that persuaded him that many of his judi-
 
99. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
100. On Pinkney’s views, see Dunn et al., supra note 57, at 79, 80–81. 
101. Reed v. Rhodes, 607 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1979). The case finally ended more 
than a quarter-century after it began. See Reed v. Rhodes, 1 F. Supp. 2d 
705 (N.D. Ohio 1998), aff’d per curiam, 215 F.3d 1327 (6th Cir. 2000). 
102. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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cial colleagues lacked awareness of the nation’s racial history (pp. xiv–
xvi).103 He devotes most of a chapter about his work on the bench to 
the death penalty, using a case arising from Ohio as the centerpiece 
(pp. 250–58).104 But he does talk about his efforts to diversify the legal 
profession (pp. 230–36, 293–97). And he addresses two painful situ-
ations: a lawsuit relating to whether the House Judiciary Committee 
could obtain access to grand jury materials in connection with the im-
peachment of Judge Alcee Hastings, who had been acquitted of con-
spiracy charges at his criminal trial (pp. 237–40);105 and the dispute 
that led to Frank Battisti’s relinquishing the position of chief judge af-
ter more than twenty years in that position but remaining on the bench 
until his death in 1994 (pp. 240–42).106 
Judge Jones retired from the bench in 2002, at age seventy-six, but 
he did not head for the golf course or a cruise ship. Rather, he became 
of counsel in the Cincinnati office of Blank Rome LLP, a Philadelphia-
based firm (pp. 311–12). Retiring while still energetic and in good 
health would enable him to continue “to answer the Call” in ways that 
continued service on the bench would not (p. 314). Along the way, he 
has some pointed criticisms of the Supreme Court and some trenchant 
observations about current issues affecting African Americans. 
Meanwhile, Judge Jones continues to receive accolades. Although 
he does not mention this fact, the federal building back home in 
Youngstown that houses the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio was named for him the year after he retired 
from the bench.107 And shortly after this book went to press, the 
 
103. Judge Jones does not identify the case or the judges to whom he refers, but 
it is likely that he was talking about Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 
1155 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc), in which he dissented at length, id. at 1169–
79 (Jones, J., dissenting). 
104. The issue in the case was whether the inmate could obtain a stay of 
execution, which the panel denied over a dissent by Judge Jones. Byrd v. 
Bagley, 37 F. App’x 94 (6th Cir. 2002). This was the final judicial 
installment in a long-running case. See, e.g., Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486 
(6th Cir. 2000) (affirming denial of habeas corpus); State v. Byrd, 512 
N.E.2d 611 (Ohio 1987) (affirming conviction and death sentence). 
105. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 841 F.2d 1048, 1054–57 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(Jones, J., dissenting). 
106. Under current law, the chief judge of a district court may serve in that 
capacity for no more than seven years. 28 U.S.C. § 136(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
This provision was established by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 202(a), 96 Stat. 25, 52; it was adopted long 
before the controversy over Chief Judge Battisti’s administration of his 
court arose. 
107. See Consolidated Appropriation Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, div. 
J, § 414, 117 Stat. 11, 456. 
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NAACP awarded Jones the Spingarn Medal, the organization’s highest 
honor, in 2016.108 
There is much more in Answering the Call than can be mentioned 
here. This memoir is an engrossing chronicle of the civil rights move-
ment outside the South, and it should be a valuable source for years to 
come. 
 
108. See Spingarn Medal Winners: 1915 to Today, NAACP, www.naacp. 
org/awards/spingarn-medal/winners/ [https://perma.cc/27UR-2ESQ] (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2017). 
